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ABSTRACT

on regional auctions for Dutch ground water extraction
permits. He does not consider agricultural extractions in
his analysis, because they are only temporary and will
be reduced by sprinkling bans. There is, however,
extensive literature available (e.g. Michelson & Young
1993; Dinar & Wolf 1994; Strosser, 1997) on the role of
ground water allocation mechanisms in other countries.

The economic efficiency of current and alternative
ground water policies for Dutch agriculture and their
impact on the adoption of modern irrigation technology
have been investigated. The study shows that the
current system of historical ground water extraction
rights and sprinkling bans is inefficient and provides
fewer incentives for the adoption of modern irrigation
technology than does a system that considers
externalities in the price of water or diverts water away
from agriculture while encouraging trading. These
inefficiencies may result in low-value use of ground
water and the use of traditional irrigation technologies,
which may cause desiccation.

In this paper we will investigate whether current and
alternative mechanisms allocate ground water efficiently
and whether they provide incentives for the adoption of
modern irrigation technology.
We addressed the
following research questions:
1. Do current ground water policies allocate ground
water efficiently in The Netherlands?
2. What kind of alternative policies can be used to
achieve a more efficient allocation?
3. Do these policies provide incentives for the
adoption of modern irrigation technology?
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INTRODUCTION

To answer these questions, Dutch ground water
management problems and economic efficiency
concepts are explained in more detail in Section 2.
Section 3 studies the economic efficiency of current
ground water policies. Section 4 studies the economic
efficiency of alternative ground water policies. Finally,
Section 5 contains the discussion and conclusions.

Policy instruments for ground water allocation such as
tradable extraction rights, sprinkling bans, and ground
water extraction charges determine both the economic
efficiency of ground water use and the distribution of
ground water among users. They can “queue” users and
restrict or encourage the transfer and trading of water
and adoption of water saving technologies. The current
ground water extraction rights system together with the
low ground water prices encourage low-value
agricultural ground water usage in The Netherlands.
Extraction can result in desiccation of nature areas.
Sprinkling bans in periods of serious drought and
irrigation scheduling currently aim to reduce low-value
use of ground water, but it is not clear whether these
measures are efficient and whether they provide
incentives for the adoption of modern irrigation
technology.

ECONOMIC INEFFICIENCY AND RELATED DUTCH
WATER PROBLEMS
In The Netherlands, current ground water policies
encourage both low-value agricultural ground water use,
like the sprinkling of grasslands, and the use of
traditional irrigation technologies with a low irrigation
effectiveness. Extraction may reduce temporarily and
locally the availability of water for environmental
amenities. Plant species adapted to wet and moist
environments disappear due to a lack of soil moisture.
As a result biodiversity will decline. So, extraction may
cause externalities. Private behaviour is inefficient from a
social point of view in the presence of externalities that
are not taken into account. Therefore we will evaluate

Economic literature on mechanisms to allocate ground
water in The Netherlands has been limited, especially
with respect to agriculture. Wiersma (1998) investigated
a more efficient ground water allocation procedure based
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the efficiency of various ground water policies. Two
kinds of criteria to evaluate efficiency can be
distinguished; allocative and technical efficiency
(Perman et al., 1999):

a higher water price provide incentives for the
adoption of modern irrigation technology (Zilberman
and Lipper, 1999).
CURRENT GROUND WATER POLICIES

• Allocative efficiency requires the marginal value of
water to be the same for the last unit of water
consumed by each user and equal to the marginal
cost of supplying water. Transactions are interesting
when differences exist between the marginal value of
water for different uses.

In this section we will show that current ground water
policies are in many situations inefficient. Alternative
policies to improve the economic efficiency will be
discussed in Section 4. Table 1 shows whether current
(row 3a until row 3d) and alternative (row 4a until row
4e) policies achieve the socially optimal water price, an
efficient allocation, and provide incentives for the
adoption of modern irrigation technology; i.e. improve
the technical efficiency. It also shows prerequisites for
policy instruments to be effective.

• Technical efficiency is measured by the ratio between
output and inputs. Technical efficiency can be
improved by adoption of modern water saving
technologies, which produce the same output with
less inputs. Allocation mechanisms, which establish

Table 1.

Overview of the characteristics of various ground water policies

Instrument

Current policies
3a Current price of water use
3b Current extraction rights
3c Current sprinkling bans
3d Irrigation scheduling
Alternative policies
4a Water pricing reform
4b (non)tradable extraction rights:
Quota: -proportion current use
-per crop
Markets:-without restriction on use
-with restrictions on use
4c Fine-tuned sprinkling bans
4d Persuasion
4e Subsidy: -proportion current use
-per crop

1)

Socially
optimal
water
price

The value of the marginal
product is equal among all
users farm
land at
land
the farm

Incentives
for adoption
of
modern
technology

Prerequisites for policy
instruments to be
effective

N
N
N
N

N
N
N
N

Y
Y
N
N

Y
Y
N
N

N
N
Y
Y

Penalties
Adoption

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Negative price elasticity

N
N
N
Y
N
N
N
N

Y
Y
N
Y
Y
N
Y
Y

N
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
N
Y

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y

Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
N
N

Penalties, efficient
assignment of quota
Efficiency gains have to
exceed transaction cost
Penalties, fine-tuning
No myopic behaviour
Participation in subsidy
schemes

Y means that the price is equal to the socially optimal water price or that the value of the marginal product of
water is equal among all users or farmland or land at the farm or that incentives exist for the adoption of
modern irrigation technology; N means that this is not the case
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3a) Current Price of Water Use

3c) Current Sprinkling Bans

Since it was introduced in January 1995, Dutch ground
water extraction is subject to a charge of € 0.08 per m3 (to
be increased to € 0.15 per m3), but the current charge is
restricted to farmers withdrawing more than 30,000 m3 of
ground water per annum. Only a small percentage of
farmers (about 1 to 2 percent) exceed this charge-free
threshold, and are subject to this charge (Staalduinen et
al. 1996). Most farmers currently only pay the energy
costs of lifting water from the stock to the field (i.e.
about € 0.04 per m3 ).

Low-value agricultural use of ground water by
agriculture is currently reduced by imposing sprinkling
bans, diverting water away from current agricultural use
to non-agricultural and/or future use. These bans differ
per province and vary with respect to the source of
water used (ground water versus surface water), crop
grown (grass versus arable), soil type (sandy versus
clay), and time period (part of the year and day). Bans
especially aim to reduce ground water use for sprinkling
of grass on sandy soils in areas sensitive to desiccation
during dry periods.

The current pricing system of water implies that
externalities, which arise due to agricultural ground
water extraction, are not yet fully internalised in the price
of applied water. Marginal values of the last unit of
ground water applied are not equal among users, since
farmers maximise individual (instead of social) current
(instead of future) profit each period. In the absence of
sprinkling bans, it seems reasonable to assume that they
pump water until its marginal net benefit is zero. The
value of the marginal product is therefore equal among
all farmland irrigated. Such a low water price does not
provide incentives for the adoption of modern irrigation
technology (see row 3a in Table 1).

Current bans are only rough restrictions and are not
efficient. There are for instance no arable crop-specific
sprinkling bans, while marginal values of water vary
among arable crops. If bans reduce current ground water
usage, they will increase the shadow price, which will
provide incentives for the adoption of modern irrigation
technology (see row 3c in Table 1).
3d) Irrigation Scheduling
In response to the resistance the bans raised, a
management tool for irrigation scheduling was
developed and tested in 1995, often referred to as the
irrigation planner. It gives farmers a better insight into
the moisture regime of their plots, the best timing to start
irrigation and the best water dose, and prevents overirrigation and thus increases the irrigation effectiveness.
It does not only have a water-saving effect but also has
a variable cost-saving effect with respect to extraction
cost. The irrigation planner is a disembodied
innovation, which means that it is not embodied in a
physical item. It is practical knowledge that can be
shared by many users. It is an unshielded innovation,
since the ability of private firms to appropriate some of
the benefits associated with the use of it is limited
(Sunding & Zilberman, 1999). The development of the
irrigation planner was therefore a public funded R&D
effort.

3b) Current Extraction Rights

In The Netherlands, ground water extraction is currently
determined by free extraction licences granted by local
authorities (provinces) in the past. These licences can
be considered as historical extraction rights (“grandfathering rules”). An extraction right was only refused
when the extraction could damage other users, while
damage of extraction to ecosystems was until very
recently not taken into account. Under such a ground
water extraction rights system nature is jeopardised,
since it encourages agricultural ground water extraction.
The current ground water extraction rights system is not
efficient, since current allocation rules are based on a
“queuing” system that restricts the transfer and trading
of water rights. The water price which is equal to the
extraction costs, will be below the socially optimal water
price, which provides fewer incentives for the adoption
of modern irrigation technology. Current allocation rules
“queue” in particular users who are interested in the
maintenance of stream flows like nature. Marginal
values of the last unit of ground water applied are not
equal among users (see row 3b in Table 1).

If irrigation scheduling is adopted, it will improve the
technical efficiency. The water price will, however, still
be below the socially optimal water price. The value of
the marginal product will not be equal among land at the
farm, since the irrigation planner gives only rough
indications to reduce usage (see row 3d in Table 1).
Alternative Ground Water Policies
In Section 3 it became clear that current ground water
policies are indeed inefficient. The efficiency of new
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options and their impact on the adoption of modern
irrigation technology are studied in this section. We
discuss the pros and cons of 1) three economic
instruments, water pricing reform, agricultural water
markets and subsidies; 2) two command and control
based instruments, quota and fine-tuned bans; and 3) a
social instrument, persuasion.

a certain base period. In that case the marginal value of
the last unit of water applied becomes equal among land
at the farm, but not among all farmland. Alternatively,
quotas can be assigned per crop in such a way that the
marginal value of the last unit of water applied becomes
equal among all farmland, which is more efficient. The
first assignment seems to be more socially equitable,
because the latter assignment will target some farms,
mainly with low-value use, more seriously than others.
Economists provide, however, only insight into
alternative allocations of rents. Policy makers have to
judge whether this is socially equitable. The shadow
price of agricultural ground water use will increase if
ground water is diverted away from current agricultural
use to non-agricultural and/or future use by means of a
quota, which will provide incentives for the adoption of
modern irrigation technology. Adequate penalties have
to be imposed, which involves monitoring and control
costs.

4a) Water Pricing Reform
The extent of divergence between the private and social
price of water, represents the optimal volumetric charge
that induces the individual farmer to behave in the
socially optimal way. Not only extraction costs but also
environmental and resource costs have to be considered
in the socially optimal price of water. This increases the
price of water and consequently creates incentives for
the adoption of modern irrigation technology (see row
4a in Table 1).
The theoretical framework of efficient water-pricing
schemes is clear, but there are some problems. Firstly, it
is hard to determine the level of charges, since monetary
values have to be attached to the damage due to
excessive use of ground water, whereas perpetrators of
externalities usually evaluate damage less severely than
other interest groups. Secondly, water pricing schemes
often ignore information needed for implementation.
Implementation problems are linked to enforcement,
monitoring, institutional limitations, conflicting policies,
and welfare implications. Thirdly, the introduction of
price reform is conditional upon the size of the social
gains relative to the transaction costs. Additional costs
will be low, because only the charge-free threshold has
to be reduced under the current ground water tax
system. Finally, water-pricing reform only has a positive
influence on water conservation if the price elasticity of
water demand is significantly different from zero and is
negative. Agricultural water demand is usually inelastic
only up to a given price level (Garrido, 1999). This “price
threshold” depends on the productivity of water, the set
of alternative production strategies, the proportion of
land devoted to permanently-irrigated crops, and the
irrigation technologies.

Agricultural Ground Water Extraction Rights Markets
The efficiency gains of agriculture associated with the
transition from “queuing” systems to agricultural
extraction rights markets result from an increase in the
area of land that the amount of ground water available
for agriculture can serve (Zilberman et al., 1994). Moving
water that has a relatively low marginal productivity to
land that has not been irrigated before increases water
productivity (Shah & Zilberman, 1992). Because water
availability per hectare is currently relatively large on all
farmland on which irrigation is desirable in The
Netherlands (although not during all seasons), transition
to agricultural extraction rights markets is less
interesting. Efficiency gains will be small relative to the
transaction costs. Agricultural extraction rights markets
will become more interesting if agricultural water
availability is restricted to the socially optimal level.
Transition to agricultural water markets while diverting
water away from current agricultural use may decrease
agricultural sector’s well-being to some extent, but is
desirable from a social point of view. A possible
efficiency gain of agriculture is associated with the
adoption of modern technologies, which result from
incentives created by higher water prices established
under agricultural water rights markets.

4b) (Non)tradable Extraction Rights:
Ground Water Extraction Quota

An equitable introduction of water markets is hard to
establish. Rights can, for instance, be auctioned off so
that the authorities reap all the rent from new
entitlements. An alternative is to allow senior rights
owners to sell their water to buyers and benefit from the
revenues of the sales. It is important to avoid transfers
of extraction rights to regions sensitive to desiccation.

Ground water extraction rights have to be divided among
farmers with the intention to allocate a restricted amount
of supply in a most efficient and equitable way, which is
not easy to establish. Quotas can be assigned in
proportion to ground water extraction by each farmer in
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• Another option is to attach environmental conditions
like less ground water extraction to direct income
payments and to withhold payments to farmers who
do not fulfil environmental conditions like defined in
the Codes of Good Agricultural Practice; i.e. to use
the instrument of cross-compliance. No additional
subsidy is received. Money saved can be reallocated to increase agri-environmental programmes
for the protection of ground water resources.

4c) Fine-Tuned Bans
If bans are fine-tuned to resource, region, soil, crop, and
time specific circumstances and set to achieve the
socially optimal agricultural ground water use level, they
will allocate water efficiently. Such bans increase the
shadow price, which provides incentives for the
adoption of modern irrigation technology. There is a
high demand for technical knowledge to fine-tune the
bans. Nevertheless, they are suitable to restrict
extraction under specific circumstances. Transaction
costs will be low; it is only a refinement of current bans
(see row 4c in Table 1).

• Finally, farmers and nature conservationists can
make commitments on the use of ground water in a
voluntary agreement and negotiate about
compensation payments.

4d) Persuasion to Adopt Irrigation Scheduling
DISCUSSION
It is not likely that farmers will adopt irrigation
scheduling under the low water prices they currently
face. Motives for adoption of the irrigation planner are
saving in costs, government-supported incentives, and
persuasion. Motives for not using it are the investment
costs that it entails, its complexity and the effort that its
use will require. Practical test results showed that indeed
only a small group of farmers would start using the
irrigation planner of their own accord (Boland et al.,
1996). Farmers are therefore subsidised and extension
and education activities were started to encourage
adoption. Besides, farmers were persuaded that bans
would be abolished in the region, if a certain diffusion
rate was met, i.e. if a certain number of farmers adopted
the irrigation planner. Those who do not adopt also
benefit from abolition. They can be considered as “free
riders.” It is hard to persuade farmers that extraction has
a negative impact, because they often behave myopic
(see row 4d in Table 1).

This study shows that current policies do indeed
allocate ground water inefficiently in The Netherlands.
We found that the current system of water prices,
extraction rights, sprinkling bans, and irrigation
scheduling did not equalise the value of the marginal
product of water among all users and that nature may
consequently be desiccated.
The study also shows that various alternative
mechanisms can be used to achieve a more efficient
allocation of ground water, but that each has its own
prerequisites which have to be fulfilled. Whether the
command and control based instruments studied here
will allocate ground water efficiently depends on the
penalties imposed, the way quotas are assigned, and the
way bans are fine-tuned. Economic instruments like
subsidies and pricing reforms will only reduce usage if
farmers participate in subsidy schemes and if the price
elasticity of water demand is negative. The theoretical
framework of efficient water pricing is clear, but there are
implementation problems. Persuasion only works if
farmers do not behave myopically. Introduction of
instruments is conditional upon the size of the social
gains relative to the transaction costs. The high
transaction costs of agricultural water markets are
especially a problem when water availability per hectare
for irrigation is large, which is currently the case in The
Netherlands. In that case there will be efficiency gains if
availability is restricted.

4e) Subsidies to Reduce Agricultural Water Use
Subsidies can be provided to reduce ground water use
to the socially optimal application level. A reduction in
extraction is, however, not guaranteed, since
participation is often voluntary. Besides, no increase in
the water price will be established. Various possibilities
to integrate water subsidies in Common Agricultural
Policies are described below:
• An option is to design agri-environmental
programmes under regulation 2078/92, that can be
used to compensate farmers for the damage due to a
reduction in ground water extraction; for instance,
wetland recovery like in Spain (Varela & Sumpsi,
1999). Payments can be based on proportional
reductions of current extraction or on crop specific
reductions.

Allocation mechanisms that increase the price or
shadow price of water provide incentives for the
adoption of modern irrigation technology; i.e. improve
the technical efficiency. We found that volumetric
charges and water markets with a restriction on usage
increased the water price, while quotas and sprinkling
bans increased the shadow price of water and therefore
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create incentives for the adoption of modern irrigation
technology. Since current water prices only reflect
extraction costs under current extraction rights, they do
not create incentives for the adoption of modern
irrigation technology.

Michelson, A. M. & R. A. Young. (1993). Optioning
Agricultural Water Rights for Urban Water Supplies
During Drought, American Journal of Agricultural
Economics 75, pp.1010-1020.
Perman, R., Y. Ma, J. McGilvray, & M. Common (1999).
Natural resource and environmental economics,
second edition, Longman.

We should be careful with exceptions when allocation
mechanisms are being designed as illustrated by the
charge-free threshold for agricultural ground water
extraction, which is only exceeded by a small percentage
of farmers. This charge on ground water extraction is not
a very effective policy instrument to reduce low-value
agricultural ground water extraction.
In this paper various ground water policies are
discussed separately, whereas they can be combined in
such a way that they reinforce each other. The irrigation
planner, for instance, seems to be a very useful
instrument in combination with other instruments. An
empirical analysis can provide insight into the optimal
instrument mix.

Shah, F. & D. Zilberman. (1992). Queuing vs. Markets.
Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics,
University of California.
Staalduinen L. C. van, M.W. Hoogeveen, C. Ploeger & J.
Dijk. (1996). Heffing van grondwaterbelasting via
een forfait; Een onderzoek naar de mogelijkheden
voor de land- en tuinbouw. Publicatie 3.163,
Agricultural Economics Research Institute, The
Hague.
Strosser, P. (1997). Analysing alternative policy
instruments for the irrigation sector; An assessment
of the potential for water market development in the
Chishtian Sub-division, Ph.D. Thesis, Wageningen
Agr. University.

According to the farmers irrigation of grassland is not a
low-value application, because benefits other than
changes in output should be calculated as well. If soils
are very sensitive to drought, irrigation may be essential
for good farm management to avoid a long recovery
period of the crop due to drought damage to the roots.
Besides, irrigation leads to better mineral utilisation,
which is beneficial to the environment.

Sunding D. & D. Zilberman. (1999). The agricultural
innovation process: research and technology
adoption in a changing agricultural
sector
(handbook).

The study shows that the current system of historical
ground water extraction rights and sprinkling bans is
inefficient and provides fewer incentives for the adoption
of modern irrigation technology than does a system that
considers externalities in the price of water or diverts
water away from agriculture while encouraging trading.
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